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1Preferences and the Dynamic Representative
Consumer
Abstract This paper provides families of time-separable, twice continuously diﬀeren-
tiable, and strictly concave utility functions of a group of consumers that are both suﬃcient
and necessary in order to have linear aggregation in a single-commodity-type deterministic
dynamic environment, in the presence of consumer wealth-, labor-productivity, and pref-
erence heterogeneity, for alternative settings where the rates of time preference can be the
same or diﬀerent across consumers. The employed concept of linear aggregation pertains the
existence of a representative consumer with a time-separable utility function. It is proved
that when the rates of time preference are choice-independent and heterogeneous across con-
sumers, a representative consumer exists if, and only if, the momentary utility functions of
all consumers are exponential. Results are also provided for, (i) common across consumers
choice-independent rates of time preference, and, (ii) heterogeneous choice-dependent rates
of time preference, and compared with previously identiﬁed suﬃcient conditions for aggre-
gation in the existing literature.
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The ﬁndings of Gorman (1953) on the necessary and suﬃcient conditions for the existence
of social indiﬀerence curves in static frameworks, have provided us with a pure message for
demand aggregation: social preferences (represented by a ‘social’ utility function over aggre-
gated equilibrium demands) exhibit indiﬀerence curves under all price domains and under
all domains of income- and preference heterogeneity if, and only if, consumer preferences
imply that all consumer Engel curves are parallel at the same prices.1 In that case, social
preferences can be seen as the preferences of a single, not necessarily existing consumer,
the ‘representative consumer,’ whose choice of goods, by construction, always coincides with
aggregate demand. Later on, Pollak (1971), fully characterized the family of additively
separable utility functions of consumers over many commodities that deliver the Gorman
(1953)-type of aggregation result in a static framework.
This paper shares a similar goal to this of Pollak (1971), but in a dynamic environment.
In particular, the goal of the present study is to identify the comprehensive family of time-
separable, twice continuously diﬀerentiable, and strictly concave utility functions that lead
to a representative consumer with a time-separable utility function in deterministic dynamic
e n v i r o n m e n t sw i t ho n ec o m m o d i t yt y p e . I ns u c ha ne n v i r o n m e n t ,a te a c hp o i n ti nt i m e ,
Engel curves depend on both wealth- and labor income, and also on future savings and
consumption paths, a key complication that necessitates a diﬀerent treatment.
Gorman’s (1953) study was motivated by the desire to build static demand systems
with tractable features in order to facilitate the applied analysis of consumer choice. Yet,
in modern theory of the dynamic consumer who has savings options and forms optimal
consumption plans over time, the need for aggregation results is more essential. Static
1 This type of aggregation is usually called “exact linear aggregation.”
3models stress wealth heterogeneity as an exogenous economic attribute. On the contrary,
in dynamic analysis, the evolution of the wealth distribution is endogenous, and, above all,
it depends on individual demands. The distribution of individual demands determine the
distribution of savings that maps to a new distribution of future consumption possibilities
for each household.
A key determinant of demands in a dynamic environment is also the consumers’ time
preferences, i.e. their preferences for waiting until the consumption of a quantity of a good in
the future. Our insights for exact linear aggregation in static environments that are provided
by the existing literature on the subject, can fail to be generalized for dynamic environments,
especially when the rates of time preference vary across consumers. The present study pays
special attention to examining the potential for aggregation in dynamic economies with
heterogeneous rates of time preference.
In an inﬁnite-horizon dynamic world, the commodity space for each individual is inﬁnite-
dimensional. It is understandable that the existence of Gorman (1953)-type social indiﬀer-
ence curves in an inﬁnite-dimensional commodity space requires a special mathematical
treatment. The scope of this paper is not up to that. Instead, the goal is to show neces-
sary and suﬃcient conditions on the community preference proﬁle so that there exist social
preferences consistent with the independence axiom of Koopmans (1960), namely that if
two diﬀerent intertemporal paths have a common outcome at a certain point in time, pref-
erences over these two paths should always, and solely, be determined by comparing them
with remaining outcomes at that particular date that diﬀer. In other words, the focus of
this paper is on characterizing community preference proﬁles where social preferences are
time-separable and, at each point in time, social indiﬀerence curves exist.
This focus has a strong motive. The fact that the implied (and identiﬁed) utility function
4of the representative consumer is time-separable, allows the extension to general-equilibrium
models, where the computation of future prices becomes tractable through solving a simple
dynamic-programming problem of the representative consumer using the aggregate-economy
consumer wealth and productivity. This can be a great facility, if it is applicable to an
economic question of distribution dynamics, especially through paper-and-pencil methods.
Several authors, starting with the contribution of Chatterjee (1994), which was followed
by Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), Caselli and Ventura (2000), Maliar and Maliar (2001) and
(2003), provide dynamic setups and suggest speciﬁc parametric forms for individual utility
functions that are suﬃcient for the existence of a dynamic representative consumer. All
these studies provide insights about the qualitative and quantitative relationship between
the speciﬁc utility functions they employ and wealth distribution dynamics. In light of the
powerful and directly testable analytics of these applications, a complete characterization
of the family of preferences that lead to a representative consumer seems crucial. Such a
characterization can deﬁne the scope of further questions on heterogeneity that can be asked,
while retaining the analytical facility provided by the linear aggregation property.
The ﬁrst part of the analysis of the present paper pertains deterministic economies with
a single type of commodity, and time-invariant momentary utility functions, similarly to
Chatterjee (1994). Under the restrictions of no preference heterogeneity and of time-invariant
momentary utility functions, Chatterjee (1994) has provided the complete family of utility
functions that lead to a representative consumer, although he presents these utility functions
only as suﬃcient, but not as necessary. In Pollak (1971), these utility functions were also
proved to be the only ones to deliver the aggregation result in a static framework with
time-separable preferences over multiple goods.
But the scope of the necessary and suﬃcient community preference proﬁles for a repre-
5sentative consumer is more restricted while considering another issue that has been rather
unexplored. Since Becker’s (1980) result that heterogeneity in (constant) choice-independent
rates of time preference leads asymptotically to a degenerate wealth distribution, the prim-
itives that may lead to a representative consumer have not been studied. It is proved that,
with heterogeneity in choice-independent rates of time preference, a representative consumer
exists if, and only if, the momentary utility functions of all consumers are exponential.
Moreover, a more general setting is studied, with time-variant momentary utility func-
tions when individual rates of time preference have a consumption-choice-independent part
wich is common-across agents, and a consumption—choice-dependent part implied by their
momentary utility function. The case of Caselli and Ventura (2000) arises as a special case.
Yet, it is proved that one cannot generalize much more than in Caselli and Ventura (2000):
t h eo n l yp a r a m e t e rt h a tc a nb et i m e - v a r i a n ti st h es u b s i s t e n c el e v e l s( o rb l i s sp o i n t s -i fa n y ) ,
with additional restrictions for the case where consumer utility functions are all exponential.
The starting point of the paper, Section 2, deals with the economy where consumers have
choice-independent rates of time preference and time-invariant momentary utility functions.
Section 2 is split into two subsections, one studying the case where all agents have the same
rate of time preference but heterogeneous momentary utility functions, and one subsection
where rates of time preference can be, in addition, heterogeneous. Section 3 deals with the
case where agents have time-variant momentary utility functions. Section 4 summarizes the
results.
2. Choice-independent rates of time preference (time-invariant
momentary utility functions)
Time is continuous and the time horizon is inﬁnite, t ∈ [0,∞). Consumers are all inﬁnitely-
lived and comprise a constant set I of diﬀerent types, with generic element i. The set of
6consumer types can be countable, ﬁnite, or a continuum. It can also be that all consumers
are of the same type, but in all cases there is a “large” number of households, making
each of them having negligible impact on the aggregate economy, or else, all consumers are
price-takers. Assume a measure µ : I→[0,1], which has a density, dµ,w i t h ,
inf {dµ(i) | i ∈I}> 0 .( 1 )
So, if I is ﬁnite, dµ(i) > 0 for all i ∈I , whereas if I is a compact interval, dµ(i) is
continuous on I and bounded away from 0. Consumers of diﬀerent types can diﬀer with
respect to their initial endowment of capital claims (assets) and also with respect to their
labor productivity which is given by the exogenous function of time, θ
i : R+ → R+. Asset
holdings for household i ∈Iat time 0 are denoted as ai
0.
There is a single private consumable good. Consumer preferences of each i ∈I ,a r eg i v e n
by the general additively-separable utility function with the rate of time preference captured




















dt .( 2 )
Assumption 1 For all i ∈I , ui : R+ → R, is twice-continuously diﬀerentiable and
such that ui
1 (c) > 0 and ui
11 (c) < 0 on some interval, Ci ⊆ R+, with both ui
1 (c) < ∞ and
−∞ <u i
11 (c) for all c ∈ Ci ⊆ R+,with ci ≡ inf (Ci) < sup(Ci) ≡ ¯ ci.
Assumption 1 simply secures that, for all i ∈I , there is a choice domain, Ci ⊆ R+,w h i c h
is an interval, and where standard desirable properties of momentary utility functions are
present.





0 ρi(τ)dτdt < ∞ for all i ∈I.
Apart from the technical facility providedb yA s s u m p t i o n2i nd e v e l o p i n gp r o o f so ft h e
7theorems below, one of its implications is that any agent can choose a consumption path
such that the consumption level is asymptotically non-decreasing.
All consumers are endowed with the same amount of time at each moment, that is
supplied inelastically for labor. The momentary time endowment is normalized to one.
Regardless of the production process underlying the economy, for any given price vector
(r(t),w(t))t≥0 >> 0,w i t hr(t) being the interest rate and w(t) the labor wage at each




i (t)w(t) − c
i (t) ,( 3 )






i (t)=0.( 4 )
Last, to deﬁne the domains of wealth- and productivity heterogeneity at any given price
vector, for which the existence of a representative consumer is conceptually relevant. That is
the domain that guarantees interiority of solutions to each individual optimization problem.
The following assumption states this formally.
Assumption 3 Given a community preference proﬁle captured by the collection
of functions (ρi,u i)i∈I, the domain of initial distribution of assets (ai
0)i∈I,o ft h e




i∈I,a n do fp r i c e s(r(t),w(t))t≥0,
is restricted so that the problems of all consumers i ∈Iare well-deﬁned and the
solution to each individual problem is interior for all t ≥ 0.
Given Assumption 3, maximizing (2) subject to the constraints (3) and (4) for any given
ai



























i.e., consumption rules at each moment are memoryless, depending only on current personal
assets and current and future prices. Assumptions 1 and 4 have a particular connection,




11(ci(t)) must be always well-deﬁned in order
to have interiority. Thus, in order to meet Assumption 3 (interior solutions), it is necessary
that ci (t) ∈ Ci,f o ra l lt ≥ 0,a n da l li ∈I.
The solution to the partial-equilibrium problem of the households yields all individual
consumption demands and asset supply functions that can be combined with a large class of
settings for the production side guaranteeing that market-clearing prices are such that both
general-equilibrium decision rules and prices can be either memoryless or time-invariant,
depending only on the distribution of household assets at each moment. Such supply-side
settings are not discussed. The focus is on the basic partial-equilibrium household problem,
and, in particular, on the conditions on the utility function that lead to a representative
consumer with time-separable preferences.
Deﬁnition 1 Given a community preference proﬁle captured by the collection
of functions (ρi,u i)i∈I, complying with Assumptions 1 and 2, a representative
consumer (denoted by “RC”) is a (ﬁctitious) consumer who has time-separable
preferences,
  ∞
0 vRC (c(t),t)dt, with vRC
1 (c,t),vRC
11 (c,t) and vRC
12 (c,t) existing,
and with vRC
1 (c,t) < ∞ and −∞ <v RC
11 (c,t),vRC
12 (c,t) for all consumption
levels, c ∈ CRC ≡
 
c ∈ R+
   c =
 
I cidµ(i) , ci ∈ Ci, i ∈I
 
, for all t ≥ 0, and
who possesses the economy-wide aggregate wealth and productivity at all times,
and whose demand functions coincide with the aggregate demand functions of the

































dµ(i) ,( 7 )
for all t ≥ 0, for the complete domain of prices (r(t),w(t))t≥0, initial dis-




i : R+ → R
 
i∈I that comply with
Assumption 3.
It is emphasized, again, that this is a strong concept of a representative consumer that
aims at providing the facility of solving only the representative-cosumer’s problem using
standard optimal-control techniques, in order to derive aggregate demands at all times.
2.1 Common choice-independent rates of time preference among
all consumers at all times
T h ec a s ew h e r eρi : R+ → R++ is such that ρi = ρ for all i ∈Ii sas t a n d a r dc o n v e n t i o ni n
most literature with dynamic consumers. The ﬁrst theorem pertains this special case, pro-
viding a complete characterization of the collection of momentary utility functions, (ui)i∈I,




Ci is non-empty and not a singleton.
Assumption 4 places a constraint on the scope of preference heterogeneity. It says that
nobody’s bliss point (if any), should be lower than (or equal to) anyone else’s subsistence
level of consumption (if any), hence ∩
i∈I
Ci is an interval.
10Theorem 1 When ρi (t)=ρ(t) for all i ∈Iand all t ≥ 0, under Assumptions




⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨










with α>0 and βi ∈ R or α<0 and βi ∈ R++
with βi > 0
,
(8)
for all i ∈I . The representative consumer has the common, across households,























Proof of Theorem 1
Part 1: Necessity
Fix any function ρ : R+ → R++,a n da n yc o l l e c t i o n(ui)i∈I, with properties complying
with Assumptions 1,2 and 4. Assume that a representative consumer exists with some
momentary utility function vRC : CRC×R+ → R,o ft h ef o r mvRC (c(t),t),a te a c hp o i n ti n














































is the temporal rate of time preference of the representative consumer.
(Necessity) Step 1: preliminary characterization of the function
  ∞
0 vRC (c(t),t)dt.
According to Deﬁnition 1, the existence (and the implied preference primitives) of the
representative consumer should be independent from any price regime. The case where
r(t)=ρ(t) for all t ≥ 0, should always be included in the price domain. To see this, ﬁx any
moment in time, t ∈ R+,p i c ka n yc o n s u m e ri ∈I , and multiply her budget constraint, (3),
by the integrating factor e−
 τ
















i (τ)w(τ)dτ .( 1 1 )
For the case r(t)=ρ(t) for all t ≥ 0, under Assumption 3, (5) implies that ˙ ci (t)=0for all














,f o ra l lt ≥ 0.( 1 2 )





i∈I and (w(t))t≥0 securing
that ˆ ci ∈ Ci for all i ∈I , and for all t ≥ 0, so, Assumption 3, indeed, holds. Therefore, the
case r(t)=ρ(t) for all t ≥ 0, is always part of the domain complying with Assumption 3,
for any (ui)i∈I that satisﬁes Assumptions 1 and 2.




































ignoring the constant, since this is a utility function. Setting,
u
RC (c) ≡ v
RC (c,0) ,












RC (c(t))dt .( 1 3 )













for all i ∈I.




















i (t) ∈ C
i 
i∈I , that are consumer-equilibrium choices, and t ≥ 0 .
13(Necessity) Step 2: characterization of fRC : R+ → R++ and (fi : R+ → R++) i∈I.I nt h i s
step it is shown that,
(14) ⇔
⎧
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎨
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎩




for some α ∈ R and some βi ∈ R,f o ra l li ∈I
⎫
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎬
⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎪ ⎭
.( 1 5 )
The suﬃciency part of (15) is both straighforward and not needed for the proof of the
theorem, so, the focus is on proving the necessity part of (15). So, let (14) hold, being the
only information available about fRC : R+ → R++ and the collection (fi : R+ → R++) i∈I.






i∈I and (w(t))t≥0,w h e r eai
0 = a0 and θ
i = θ,s ot h a tci (t)=˜ c for all i ∈I ,a n da l l





RC (c) ≡ f
RC (c) − f
RC (˜ c) ,( 1 6 )
and,
Φ
i (c) ≡ f
i (c) − f
i (˜ c) ,f o r a l l i ∈I.( 1 7 )






i (˜ c)di .( 1 8 )
Moreover, given (1), set µ such that,
0 <µ≤ inf {dµ(i) | i ∈I} .( 1 9 )
N o wp i c ka n ya r b i t r a r yc o n s u m e rt y p ei ∈I, keep prices as before and modify the previous
distribution by just adding to µ of this consumer type diﬀerent wealth or productivity that
yields ci (t)=( ˜ c +∆ c) ∈∩
i∈I
Ci, for all t ≥ 0. Since prices are the same, cj (t)=˜ c,f o r
14all j ∈I \{ i} and for some consumers of type i with measure µ(i) − µ,a n df o ra l lt ≥ 0.






i (∆c +˜ c) .( 2 0 )
Since the choice of i ∈I , ∆c,a n d˜ c ∈∩
i∈I
Ci,w e r ea r b i t r a r y ,a n ds i n c ew ec a nc o n s t r u c tt h e
same distribution of consumption choices for all i ∈I, (20) holds for all i ∈I ,s o ,
Φ
i (c)=Φ( c) forall c ∈∩
i∈I
C
i and for all i ∈I.( 2 1 )
Given (12), we are able to construct any interior optimal path with distribution of consump-
tions with ci (t)=c ∈∩
i∈I




i (c)=Φ( c) forall c ∈∩
i∈I
C

























,a n dt ≥ 0 ,( 2 3 )
i.e. for the whole domain of wealth/labor-productivity heterogeneity and prices where con-
sumer choices fall in ∩
i∈I
Ci and are interior, as imposed by Assumption 4. Equation (23)
g i v e su st h ec h a n c et of u rther characterize Φ. In particular,
(23) ⇔ Φ is aﬃne on ∩
i∈I
C
i.( 2 4 )
The suﬃciency part of (24) is straightforward, so for the necessity part of (24) let’s set,
z
i ≡ c
i − ˜ c ,( 2 5 )
with ˜ c deﬁned as above for an arbitrary ˜ c ∈∩
i∈I
Ci, in the case where r(t)=ρ(t) for all t ≥ 0.
So, ﬁx ˜ c and set,
Ψ(z) ≡ Φ(z) − Φ(0) ,( 2 6 )
15s i n c ew ek n o wt h a tf o rt h et r a n s f o r m e dv a r i a b l e ,z,t h ec h o i c eo f0 f a l l si nt h ec l a s so fi n t e r i o r
solutions to a distribution in the domain of (ui)i∈I, namely the case where all consumers
choose ˜ c ∈∩
i∈I
Ci at all times. It is now shown that Ψ is a linear functional. For any partition
of consumers, irrespective of their consumer types, say, I1,I2 ⊂I ,w i t hI1 ∩I 2 = ∅,
and
 
I1 dµ(i)=µ, retaining r(t)=ρ(t) for all t ≥ 0,p r o v i d et h es a m ea0 and a labor-
productivity function θ to all i ∈I 1, so that consumption is equal to (∆c +˜ c) ∈∩
i∈I
Ci for
all i ∈I 1 at all times, provide to the remaining consumers ˜ a0 and a labor-productivity ˜ θ,s o
that their consumption is equal to ˜ c ∈∩
i∈I
Ci for all i ∈I 2 at all times. Then, zi =∆ c for all
i ∈I 1,a n dzi =0for all i ∈I 2,s o ,
Φ(µ∆c)=Φ( µ∆c +( 1− µ)0) ,
and (23) and (26) imply that,
Φ(µ∆c)=µΦ(∆c)+( 1− µ)Φ(0) ,
or,
Ψ(µ∆c)=µΨ(∆c) .( 2 7 )
It is important to notice that the choices of ∆c and µ were arbitrary. So, we can take any




µ1 = ξ ∈ R+. Repeating the same
steps, (27) yields, Ψ(µ1∆c)=µ1Ψ(∆c) and Ψ(ξµ1∆c)=ξµ1Ψ(∆c),o r ,
Ψ(ξµ1∆c)=ξΨ(µ1∆c),f o r a l l ξ ∈ R+ .( 2 8 )
Since Ψ is a univariate function, (28) is suﬃcient to prove that it is linear. So, let,
Ψ(z)=αz , α ∈ R,
and, due to the linearity of Ψ, the transformation (25) can be ignored, having (26) and (22)




i (c)=Φ( c)=αc − α˜ c , α ∈ R, for all c ∈∩
i∈I
C
i and for all i ∈I.( 2 9 )
With (29) at hand, it is easy to show that,
Φ
i (c)=Φ( c)=αc − α˜ c , α ∈ R, for all c ∈ C
i and for all i ∈I.( 3 0 )

























< ∞). There always exist some µ ∈ (0,1),w i t hµ ≤ µ(j),
such that (µcj +( 1− µ)˜ c) ∈∩
i∈I
Ci. So, retaining r(t)=ρ(t) for all t ≥ 0, provide a level a0
and a labor-productivity function θ t oam a s so fµ of type j ∈I , so that consumption is equal
to cj at all times, and also provide to the remaining consumers ˜ a0 and a labor-productivity
˜ θ, so that their consumption is equal to ˜ c ∈∩
i∈I
Ci at all times. Combining (14), (16), (17)








j +( 1− µ)˜ c
 
,
but since (µcj +( 1− µ)˜ c) ∈∩
i∈I







j − α˜ c .
since the choice of j ∈Iand cj ∈ Cj were arbitrary, (30) is proved.
So, combining (17) with (30) it is,
f
i (c)=αc − α˜ c + f
i (˜ c) for all c ∈ C
i and all i ∈I.( 3 1 )
Now that all fi’s are completely characterized over their domains, Ci, we can consider the
case of c =0 , irrespective from whether 0 ∈ Ci or not, in order to set the intercepts of all
17fi’s. Apparently, (31) implies that,
f
i (˜ c)=α˜ c + f
i (0) ,( 3 2 )
and setting fi (0) = βi for some βi ∈ R,f o ra l li ∈I , a ﬁnal combination of (31) with (32),
while, consistently with (14), setting βRC =
 
I βidµ(i),c o m p l e t et h ep r o o fo f( 1 5 ) .
(Necessity) Step 3: characterization of (ui : R+ → R++) i∈I and uRC : R+ → R++.
In light of (15), the derivation of the consumer primitives comes through simple Riemann
integration. There are two general cases, these of α  =0and α =0 .2



















ln(αc + βi)+κi ,











  + κ ,
where κ is, again some constant. Setting eκi =1 , without loss of generality, and κ accord-
ingly, the result of (8) is obtained. The special case where α =1 ,i sk n o w nt oy i e l dt h e
result that ui (c)=l n( αc + βi)+κ, through computing the limit of the above expression for
α → 1 using L’Hôpital’s rule. The preferences of the representative consumer are derived in
t h es a m ew a y .




that result in this case, can be derived from the more general functional forms that apply to α =0 .









and in order for ui
1 > 0 and ui



















c + κ ,
so, setting eκi
βi =1and κ =0yields the corresponding function in (8). With the same
reasoning for the representative consumer, the proof of the necessity part is complete.
Part 2: Suﬃciency
The particular functional forms given by (8) enable a thorough analytical characterization
of the demand functions of all consumers at all times. Again, two cases must be examined
separately, this of α  =0 , and also the case where α =0 .







[r(t) − ρ(t)] ,
so, multiplying this expression by the integrating factor e−α
 τ
t [r(s)−ρ(s)]ds and integrating over















t [r(s)−ρ(s)]ds [r(s) − ρ(s)]ds .
Multiplying this last expression by e−
 τ
t r(s)ds, integrating over all τ ∈ [t,∞),a n dc o m b i n i n g



















t [(α−1)r(s)−αρ(s)]ds   τ
t e−α
 τ





,( 3 3 )
which can be linearly aggregated across all ai’s, θ
i’s and βi’s, proving that a representative
consumer exists, as long as Assumption 1 holds, which keeps all individual demands taking
the form of (33).
















t r(s)ds   τ





,( 3 4 )
which can also be linearly aggregated across all ai’s, θ
i’s and βi’s, completing the proof of
the theorem.
Having read Pollak (1971), the result stated by Theorem 1 is not that surprising. Pollak
(1971) shows that if utility functions over a ﬁnite number of goods are additively-separable,
the only functional forms of utility per good that yield linear Engel curves are the same
as these stated by Theorem 1. Yet, the diﬀerence in the dynamic setup studied here is
the existence of an asset that stores values, and the feature that individuals have a time
preference. These two features can lead to complex trajectories of assets over time that could
inﬂuence the potential to derive linear Engel curves at all points in time. Most importantly,
unlike the main argument developed by Pollak (1971) in the ﬁnite-good static setting, it is
diﬃcult to characterize indirect utility functions in dynamic setups out of the requirement
that Engel curves are linear.3
The work by Chatterjee (1994), Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), and Caselli and Ventura
(2000) has shown that Pollak’s (1971) utility functions do lead to a representative consumer
in such dynamic settings. But unlike the spirit of the work by Pollak (1971) who provides
3 Pollak’s (1971) main theorem relies upon a ﬁnding by Gorman (1961) for static models. Gorman (1961)
proves that Engel curves are linear if, and only if, indirect utility functions possess a certain general form.
Such an extension to an optimal-control setup is, at least, demanding.
20the full set of utility functions that guarantee the existence of a representative consumer in
a static setting, it has been an open question whether there is anything more to say about
the momentary utility functions in a dynamic setting with an asset that stores value over
time. In the spirit of the setup examined by Chatterjee (1994), for the case of time-invariant
momentary utility functions (unlike the setup studied by Caselli and Ventura (2000) who
examine a case of time-variant momentary utility functions), in a single-commodity deter-
ministic environment, (unlike the case studied by Atkeson and Ogaki (1996), Maliar and
Maliar (2001) and (2003), who look at multi-type commodity setups in stochastic environ-
ments), an answer is given by Theorem 1 of the present study: there is nothing more to
say than in Pollak (1971) when all individual sh a v et h es a m er a t eo ft i m ep r e f e r e n c ea n d
n o b o d y ’ sb l i s sp o i n t( i fa n y )i sn e v e rl o w e rt h a n or equal to anyone else’s subsistence level
(if any). But is there anything more (or less) to say about time-invariant utility functions
when individual rates of time preference diﬀer? This question is examined in the section
that follows.
2.2 Heterogeneous choice-independent rates of time preference
Now the general economic environment with heterogeneous functions ρi : R+ → R++ is
considered. For developing the aggregation theorem of this section, Assumption 4 is not
necessary and it is dropped. Yet, another assumption should be added.
Assumption 5 Given a collection of functions (ρi)i∈I, that comply with As-
sumption 2, the collection of functions (ui)i∈I possesses structure such that for






0 r(τ)dτdt < ∞ ,( 3 5 )
21the domain of initial distribution of assets (ai





i∈I, and of wages (w(t))t≥0, so that the problems of
all consumers i ∈Iare well-deﬁned and the solution to each individual problem
is interior for all t ≥ 0, is non-empty.
Assumption 5 puts some restriction on the class of preferences, (ρi,u i)i∈I, but not one
that makes the issue under study uninteresting. For having a representative consumer,
interiority of individual optimal paths is an essential feature of equilibrium. In the case
of heterogeneous rates of time preference, the necessary optimality condition given by (5)
can drive the consumption of consumers towards diﬀerent directions even when consumers
have the same momentary utility function. For such a setting, assumptions such as Inada
conditions are quite usual in order to guarantee interiority. Assumption 5 does not restrict
attention to utility functions that satisfy usual Inada conditions. It simply says that for a
given (ρi)i∈I, for any path of interest rates that satisﬁes (35), (ui)i∈I, should allow some
of the remaining domain of prices and wealth/labor-productivity distributions to generate
interior solutions.






c ,( 3 6 )





























P r o o fo fT h e o r e m2
Part 1: Necessity
Fix any collection (ρi,u i)i∈I, with properties complying with Assumptions 1, 2, and
5. Assume that a representative consumer exists with some momentary utility function
vRC : CRC×R+ → R,o ft h ef o r mvRC (c(t),t), at each point in time. Under Assumption 3,








































i (t)dµ(i) .( 3 8 )
(Necessity) Step 1: preliminary characterization of the function
  ∞
0 vRC (c(t),t)dt.
Pick any arbitrary j ∈Iand assume that r(t)=ρj (t) for all t ≥ 0. Assumption 5 implies
that there exists some initial-wealth and labor-productivity-function distributions together
with some wage vector (w(t))t≥0 guaranteeing an interior optimal path of consumption
choices for t ≥ 0. In that case, (5) implies that all consumer types j will choose a consumption














,f o ra l lt ≥ 0.( 3 9 )
23With these settings, taking into account that r(t)=ρj (t) for all t ≥ 0,a n da l s o( 3 9 ) ,









































I\{j} ci (t)dµ(i)+µ(j)ˆ cj,t
  = −ρ
j (t) .( 4 0 )

































.( 4 1 )
For the same point in time, we are able to consider alternative distributions, keeping the
same wealth and productivity for all i ∈I \ { j} and give to j all combinations of initial
wealth or productivity that can fully span Cj, given equation (39). So, we can integrate





















,( 4 2 )













































































where the constant of integration is ignored, since this is a utility function. Using (42) again,










































































vRC(ω(t)+µ(j)ˆ cj,t) ,o nt h el e f t - h a n ds i d eo f( 4 4 )a n d
vRC
1 (ω(t)+µ(j)ˆ cj,t)
vRC(ω(t)+µ(j)ˆ cj,t) on the right-
hand side of (44) depend on ˆ cj,i tm u s tb et h a tb o t ha r ed o w n w a r ds l o p i n gf u n c t i o n so fˆ cj.I n
order that the representative-consumer’s problem be well-deﬁned, the momentary function
of the representative consumer must have vRC
1 (c,t) > 0, vRC
11 (c,t) < 0 on CRC,a n da l s o
vRC





be negative while all consumers in the economy always possess strictly positive rates of time




1 (c,t) > 0, so that the objective function of the




vRC(ω(t)+µ(j)ˆ cj,t) ,o r
vRC
1 (ω(t)+µ(j)ˆ cj,t)




vRC(ω(t)+µ(j)ˆ cj,t) depends on ˆ cj,b u t
vRC
1 (ω(t)+µ(j)ˆ cj,t)
vRC(ω(t)+µ(j)ˆ cj,t) does not. Then, at a
given point in time, (44) implies that ˆ cj is a function of the primitives of the representative
consumer, and of χ(t), driven by what the rest of the consumers in the economy choose. But
ˆ cj can be any, by assigning to consumer type j diﬀerent initial wealth or labor productivity
processes, a contradiction. Similarly, we can contradict that
vRC
1 (ω(t)+µ(j)ˆ cj,t)











depend on ˆ cj. In that case, nothing could prevent the rest of the consumers to choose







vRC(ω(t)+µ(j)ˆ cj,t) could only be downward-sloping, ˆ cj is, again, a function of the primitives










∂ˆ cj = κ ∈ R , t ≥ 0.( 4 5 )
Since the choice of t ∈ [0,∞) and, especially, the choice of j ∈Iwere arbitrary, a






2 (c,t) ,f o r s o m e γ (t) ∈ R, δ(t) ∈ R++, c ∈ C
RC, t ≥ 0 ,
(46)
s i n c ew ec a ns p a nt h ew h o l er a n g eo fCRC, by setting r(t)=ρi (t) for all i ∈I ,a n dr e p e a t i n g
t h es a m ea n a l y s i s .N o w ,s e t ,
υ(c,t)=l n
    v
RC (c,t)
    
,( 4 7 )
and divide both sides of (46) by vRC (c,t),t og e t ,
γ (t)υ1 (c,t) − δ(t)υ2 (c,t)=1,f o rs o m eγ (t) ∈ R, δ(t) ∈ R++, c ∈ C
RC, t ≥ 0 ,( 4 8 )
26Accordingly, condition (45) on the whole range of CRC,r e a d s ,
υ11 (c,t)=υ12 (c,t)=0, c ∈ C
RC, t ≥ 0.( 4 9 )
Conditions (48) and (49) imply that υ(c,t) must be additively separable with respect to c
and t. Speciﬁcally, υ(c,t) can only be the sum of a linear function of c and of a function of t,
namely, υ(c,t)=−φc+ζ (t).S i n c eυ2 (c,t) is the negative of the representative consumer’s
rate of time prefrerence, setting, without loss of generality, ζ (t)=−
  t






0 ρRC(τ)dτ with γ (t)φ − δ(t)ρ
RC (t)=1 (50)
for some γ (t) ∈ R, φ,ρ
RC (t),δ(t) > 0, c ∈ C
RC, t ≥ 0 .
Treating γ (t),φ,δ(t) and ρRC (t) as undetermined for the moment, returning to (38), after












r(t) − ρRC (t)
φ
, t ≥ 0 .( 5 1 )
(Necessity) Step 2: characterization of the functions (ui)i∈I.






= −βi , βi > 0 for all c
i (t) ∈ C
i and i ∈I , t ≥ 0 .( 5 2 )
To prove (52), consider a constant path of interest rates, r(t)=r>0,f o ra l lt ≥ 0.A s -
sumption 5 tells us that there always exists a distribution of initial-wealth, labor-productivity
paths and a wage vector, (w(t))t≥0, such that all individuals can have an interior optimal










where ˜ w>0 is some constant. From the necessary conditions of the problem, it is trans-







27paths will remain unchanged. In this setting with constant prices, the consumption decision
rule of each consumer type, i ∈I , is memoryless and depends only on the continuation
of ˜ θ
i
from the current moment of the decision and on. This means that, in period 0,o n e
can start any consumer type froma n yp o i n to fi t so p t i m a lp a t h ,at any moment in time,
and let the consumer continue on the same path, by modifying its initial wealth so that it
matches a choice of wealth at a future moment and by modifying ˜ θ
i
, giving the continuation
of ˜ θ
i
from that future moment at time 0. Let’s call such a modiﬁcation a path-preserving




11(ci) depends on ci,f o rs o m ei ∈I .I ft h a t
consumer type, i, has an optimal path such that ci (t1)  = ci (t2) for some t1  = t2, t1,t 2 ≥ 0,
an appropriate path-preserving modiﬁcation (which is always possible and does not violate
interiority), while keeping the features of all other consumer types the same, would violate
(51). In the very extreme case that ci (t) is constant at all times, after solving the necessary
conditions for r(t)=r, w(t)=˜ w, for all t ≥ 0,a n dai
0, ˜ θ
i











, for all t ≥ 0 ,
where ci ∈ Ci is a constant, then we can simply change ai
0 to ˆ ai
0 = ξai
0 and ˜ θ
i





(t) so that, according to the equation above, ci (t)=ˆ ci  = ci,w i t hˆ ci ∈ Ci, contradicting




11(ci) is a constant for all i ∈I ,a n d










c , βi > 0,f o ra l li ∈I.( 5 3 )
28(Necessity) Step 3: characterization of uRC and ρRC.














i (t)dµ(i) .( 5 4 )












, t ≥ 0 .
A combination of these two last equations with (50) completes the necessity part of the
theorem.
Part 2: Suﬃciency
Employing the same algebra as in Part 2 of Theorem 1, the resulting demand for indi-












t r(s)ds   τ





,( 5 5 )
which can be linearly aggregated across all ai’s, θ
i’s, βi’s, and ρi (t) at all times, completing
the proof of the theorem.
Theorem 2 relates to a number of studies that deal with the issue of heterogeneity in rates
of time preference. Becker’s (1980) result in a deterministic world, that the most patient
29consumer accumulates asymptotically all the wealth of the economy as time approaches
inﬁnity, relies heavily on imposing Inada conditions on the momentary utility functions of
the diﬀerent agent types, that lim
c→0 ui
1 (c)=∞ and lim
c→∞ ui
1 (c)=0 . If one needs facility in
computing the dynamics of aggregate wealth in a Becker (1980)-type economy by modeling








for all i ∈I . Thus, the issue of interiority of optimal paths in a Becker (1980)-type economy
is at stake, unless one makes appropriate (although possibly ad-hoc) assumptions on the
productivity processes of less patient consumer types.
Becker’s (1980) observation on a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous rates of
time preference has triggered numerous directions of research, especially along the lines of
stochastic general-equilibrium environments with idiosyncratic shocks. Probably the most
well-known application is this of Krusell and Smith (1998), who exploit the tendency of
heterogeneous rates of time preference to generate wealth disparities. They use a random
process of individual rates of time-preference in order to match U.S. wealth data that exhibit
a high Gini coeﬃcient. As this random process has a trivial probability that a person is
always the most patient, the asymptotic distribution of wealth is not degenarate, but it
simply leads to a high Gini coeﬃcient.
Krusell and Smith (1998) employ homothetic preferences with a constant elasticity of
intertemporal substitution, and a common-across-consumers random process of varying rates
of time preference. The random process of the rates of time preference is persistent, so it
implies diﬀerent conditional means for each individual in each period, whereas all individuals
have the same unconditional means of rates of time preference. The ﬁrst feature triggers wide
diﬀerences in the savings propensity across individuals, leading to a high Gini coeﬃcient for
30wealth. According to Theorem 2 of the present study, since preferences are not exponential,
one could ﬁrst think that there should not be a representative consumer in the Krusell-Smith
(1998) setting, since the conditional means of the rates of time preference are diﬀerent. Yet,
although the economic environment has, in addition to its other features, incomplete markets,
Krusell and Smith (1998) ﬁnd that equilibrium prices can be computed very well using only
the law of motion of the mean wealth, i.e. there is trivial improvement if one computes
prices from the evolution of many moments of the wealth distribution that should match
wealth-distribution dynamics very well.
On the contrary, Carroll (2000) uses exactlyt h es a m ef r a m e w o r ka si nK r u s e l la n dS m i t h
(1998), and the same stochastic processes (even numerically, in some of his applications) for
both idiosyncratic labor productivity and aggregate shocks, with the sole diﬀerence that he
employs two types of consumers, one always patient and another always impatient, both
having constant rates of time preference. The fact that, unlike in Becker (1980), the patient
consumers do not end up accumulating the economy’s wealth in the model of Carroll (2000),
rests upon the fact that all consumers receive a common process of idiosyncratic stochastic
labor earnings. Thus, the impatient ones do not save as (relatively) low as in Becker’s (1980)
model, for precautionary reasons. Carroll (2000) ﬁnds totally diﬀerent results, namely,
the approximate aggregation result of Krusell and Smith (2000) disappears. According
to Theorem 2, Carroll’s (2000) ﬁndings should not be a surprise, because the employed
preferences (the preferences of Theorem 1 with βi =0and α>0)a r en o te x p o n e n t i a l .E v e n
if no consumer has a corner solution, aggregation should fail. At the same time, equation (33)
shows that if ρ increases, the marginal propensity to consume increases as well, if α>0,
as Carroll (2000) intuitively emphasizes.4 As the exponential function implies zero quasi
4 In order to match the utility function employed by Carroll (2000) and Krusell and Smith (1998), one
should set βi =0and α>0 in equation (33), which reconﬁrms Carroll’s (2000) intuition, at least in the
deterministic continuous-time version of the model.
31elasticity of intertemporal substitution (α =0 ), changes in impatience leave the individual
marginal propensities to consume unaﬀected, as equation (55) shows.
However, the results by Krusell and Smith (1998) are still somewhat puzzling. But
equation (33), although it refers to a deterministic continuous-time environment, can oﬀer a
conjecture. Extensions to adding the continuous-time analogue of the Krusell-Smith (1998)
persistent Markov processes to the model of the present study, are likely to retain most of the
structure of demands conveyed by equation (33). If we set α>0 and βi =0 , and also replace
ρ with ρi in (33), at a ﬁrst glance, we can think that aggregation should fail, as marginal
propensities to consume (with respect to asset holdings) would change due to temporal
persistent shocks in ρi’s. But it is important to notice that the aggregation question in the
Krusell-Smith (1998) framework pertains decision rules where the accumulable state variable
is asset holdings. For forming the wealth-distribution law of motion, each agent is identiﬁed
by this sole attribute, asset holdings. So, identifying an agent by a(t) at any point in time,
the fact that there are inﬁnite agents in the Krusell-Smith (1998) model (a continuum),
makes the law of large numbers to apply. The latter means that the average-across-θ
i’s-and-
ρi’s agent holding a(t), should be aggregated over the unconditional distribution of θ
i’s and
ρi’ s ,b o t ht o d a ya n di nt h ef u t u r e .B u tl o c a la g g regation of consumers (at a certain level of
wealth) over the domain and probabilities of all θ
i’s and ρi’s, should imply similar attributes
for the demands, as these stochastic processes are common across agents in the Krusell-
Smith (1998) setting. Thus, the average-across-θ
i’s-and-ρi’s demand of an agent holding
a(t) should have the same Engel-curve slope (as implied by the unconditional means of θ
i’s
and all ρi’ s )a st h i so fany average-across-θ
i’s-and-ρi’s agent holding ˜ a(t)  = a(t),a ta n y
point in time. These parallel Engel curves among average-across-θ
i’s-and-ρi’s agents holding
some level of wealth must be the basis for the Krusell-Smith (1998) aggregation result for
32the law of motion of the wealth distribution.
Fixing a(t) and a temporal θ
i (t), as it is the case in Figure 2 of Krusell and Smith (1998,
p. 879), still leaves the Engel curves across wealth and temporal-productivity types parallel,
since the demands of each of these types are unconditionally average across ρi’s,a si ti s
conveyed by equation (33) of the present study. To the extent that a very small fraction
of agents might hit corner solutions, as Krusell and Smith (1998, p. 880) point out, gives
their “approximate aggregation” result across agents of a(t) and temporal θ
i (t)’s who are
average across ρi’s.
A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h ef a c tt h a ta g e n t sh o l d i n ga(t) receive all kinds of temporal and
persistent shocks of θ
i’s and all ρi’s and, thus, agents distinguished both by θ
i’s and all
ρi’s, have non-parallel temporal Engel curves, adds to having a higher long-run dispersion in
wealth. Thus, the Krusell-Smith (1998, Table 1, p. 884) setting with stochastic rates of time
preference delivers a higher Gini coeﬃcient on the one hand, but does not ruin the “approx-
imate aggregation” result on the other. On the contrary, in light of Theorem 2 and equation
(33), the Carroll (2000) setting with some consumers having permanently lower rates of time
preference than others, even if no consumers face a high risk to hit a corner solution, there
is no way that aggregation would hold. If consumers face tight borrowing constraints and
high probabilities of receiving very low incomes, and thus, consumers have precautionary
motives to lower their marginal propensity to consume as their wealth approaches zero, then
aggregation in the Carroll(2000) model becomes even more unlikely.
3. Choice-dependent rates of time preference (time-variant mo-
mentary utility functions)
Unlike the class of preferences examined by Gollier and Zeckhauser (2005), in the present
paper the extension to time-variant momentary utility functions pertains the case where
33individual rates of time preference have a consumption-choice-independent part wich is
common-across agents, and a consumption-choice-dependent part implied by their momen-
tary utility function. In particular, consumer preferences of each i ∈I ,a r eg i v e nb yt h e




















dt .( 5 6 )
with ρ : R+ → R++. A sequence of assumptions are importa n tf o rt h ea n a l y s i st h a tf o l l o w s .
Assumption 6 For all i ∈I ,a n da l lt ≥ 0, ui : R2
+ → R, is twice-continuously
diﬀerentiable with respect to c, and once continuously diﬀerentiable with respect
to t, and such that ui
1 (c,t) > 0 and ui
11 (c) < 0 on some interval, Ci (t) ⊆ R+,
with ui
1 (c) < ∞, −∞ <u i
11 (c), −∞ <u i
12 (c) < ∞ for all c ∈ Ci (t) ⊆ R+,with
ci (t) ≡ inf (Ci (t)) < sup(Ci (t)) ≡ ¯ ci (t).
Assumption 7 For all i ∈I , ∩
t≥0
ui
1 (Ci (t),t) is non-empty and not a single-
ton.






















Ci is non-empty and not a singleton.
Based on these assumptions, the following theorem is provided.
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with α>0 and β
i (t) ∈ R or α<0 and β
i (t) ∈ R++
with βi > 0
,
(57)
for all i ∈I , with functions β
i (t) such that Assumptions 7 and 8 are met.











































.( 5 9 )
Proof of Theorem 3
Part 1: Necessity
Fix any function ρ : R+ → R++,a n da n yc o l l e c t i o n(ui)i∈I, with properties complying
with Assumptions 2,3 and 6 through 8. Assume that a representative consumer exists with
some momentary utility function vRC : CRC×R+ → R,o ft h ef o r mvRC (c(t),t),a te a c h
point in time.












= r(t) − ρ(t) , t ≥ 0 .( 6 0 )
35Now pick r(t)=ρ(t) for all t ≥ 0, substitute it to (60) and take the indeﬁnite inegral








= κ , t ≥ 0 .( 6 1 )
where κ is some constant. Due to the fact that ui
11 (ci (t),t) < 0, and due to Assumptions
7a n d9 ,t h e r ei sa l w a y saκ>0 such that ci (t) ∈ Ci (t) for all t ≥ 0, satisfying (61). For







.( 6 2 )
The level of κ in (61) will be uniquely identiﬁed by setting ui
1 (ci (0),0) = κ and applying
(11) at time 0, combined with the dynamics of ci (t) i m p l i e db y( 6 2 ) .D u et oA s s u m p t i o n7 ,
such an interior path exists on Ci,a sCi is deﬁned in assumption 8. This means that with the
right choices of initial wealth and labor productivity, we can construct interior paths that
span Ci. Moreover, always for the case where r(t)=ρ(t) for all t ≥ 0, due to Assumption
8, for any i ∈I , we can generate any choice of c ∈∩
i∈I
Ci at any point in time, picking the
appropriate initial wealth and labor productivity, since the dynamics of consumption are
solely driven by (62).
With this facility at hand, we can look at the problem of the representative consumer,

























  = r(t) , t ≥ 0 ,
(63)



































dµ(i) .( 6 4 )



























dµ(i) .( 6 5 )
But since, as explained above, for the case where r(t)=ρ(t) for all t ≥ 0, one can gen-
erate any distribution of consumption choices, (65) holds for the whole domain implied by

















dµ(i) ,( 6 6 )
f o rt h ew h o l ed o m a i ni m p l i e db yA s s u m p t i o n3 ,i n c l u d i n gt h ec a s ew h e r er(t)=ρ(t) for
all t ≥ 0. But then, for any t ≥ 0, the same argument that was developed in step 2 of the




11(c,t) = α(t)c + β








for some α(t) ∈ R and some β
i (t) ∈ R, for all i ∈I , t ≥ 0
(67)
Using (67), with the same procedure as in step 3 of the necessity part of Theorem 1, candidate
utility functions arise. Deriving individual demands, one can verify that this is possible only
if
α(t)=α  =0,a n dβ
i (t) meeting Assumptions 7, 8, t ≥ 0 ,
and
α =0 , β
i (t)=βiG(t) ,


























37which are linear with respect to β
































βj(0) for all i,j ∈I , i.e. only when β
i (t)=
βiG(t), βi > 0 for all i ∈I , completing the necessity part.
Part 2: Suﬃciency
Follows by (68) and (69), observing that, under the statement of the theorem, they are
linear with respect to ai’s, θ
i’s and β
i’s.
4. Summary and conclusions
A representative consumer is a ﬁctitious consumer who always chooses the aggregate-demand
level optimally, as a result of maximizing her own utility function subject to the aggregate-
economy constraint, irrespective from the underlying distribution of wealth, income and
taste heterogeneity across consumers. Her existence depends on the structure of individual
utility functions in an economy. Gorman (1953) pointed out that, in a static framework, this
is possible if, and only if, the utility functions imply that the Engel curves of all consumers
are linear and parallel.
Compared to static worlds, it is more temptingt oi m p o s es u c has t r u c t u r eo ni n d i v i d u a l
utilities in dynamic general-equilibrium environments of heterogeneous agents. It is often
38useful, especially for paper-and-pencil research, to be able to compute current and future
prices out of a sole optimal-control problem, the representative-consumer’s problem, and to
obtain insightful analyses of the dynamics of wealth distributions. The goal of this study
has been to point out necessary and suﬃcient conditions on the structure of utility functions
under which such an analytical strategy is possible. The focus has been on an environment
where all individuals solve standard optimal-control problems of consumption/savings choice
and a representative consumer with time-separable preferences exists.
Consumption choices depend on future-income processes and on the ability to accumulate
an asset that stores value over time. Like in the static models, aggregation rests, again, upon
having linear and parallel Engel curves, but this time with respect to both income and asset
holdings. Identifying problems and questions of heterogeneity where such an analytical
strategy pertaining linear Engel curves is appropriate (or empirically plausible), has been
outside the scope of the analysis.
In particular, the family of individual utility functions that lead to the existence of a rep-
resentative consumer has been characterized for three settings: (i) the typical case of time-
invariant momentary utility functions where all agents share the same choice-independent
rates of time preference, (ii) time-invariant momentary utility functions where agents have
diﬀerent choice-independent rates of time preference, and, (iii) time-variant momentary util-
ity functions when individual rates of time preference have a choice-independent part wich
is common-across agents, and a choice-dependent part implied by their momentary utility
function.
The results pertaining case (i) are the same as these of Pollak (1971) for time-separable
utility functions in static environments, and come as no surprise after Chatterjee’s (1994)
results in a dynamic setting. Yet, the main message of the present paper about case (i), given
39by Theorem 1, is that, in the dynamic world, there are no other utility functions that could
deliver a representative consumer. Thus, the work by Chatterjee (1994) when momentary
utility functions are common across agents is comprehensive. Yet, Theorem 1 states the only
way that momentary utility functions can be heterogeneous in Chatterjee’s (1994) setting
for a continuous-time environment: only subsistence levels or bliss points can vary across
consumer types, but their (quasi) elasticity of intertemporal substitution must be common.
About case (ii), there is a stronger result: the only utility functions that can accommodate
a representative consumer are exponential (Theorem 2). Some implications of this result for
recent research ﬁndings (Krusell and Smith (1998) and Carroll (2000)) about stochastic
general-equilibrium models with rate-of-time preference heterogeneity were discussed.
In case (iii), it is proved that one can generalize the Caselli and Ventura (2000) setting
very little. The only parameter that can be time-variant is the subsistence levels (or bliss
points - if any) of consumers. In particular, for the exponential functions case, the corre-
sponding parameters that make individual utilities to diﬀer, must follow the same dynamic
process over time (but the initial conditions of this process can be diﬀerent for each individ-
ual). The only possible departure from the setting of Caselli and Ventura (2000) is that the
subsistence levels (or bliss points - if any) can be general, under certain restrictions stated
by Theorem 3. These conditions stated by Theorem 3, essentially allow for the existence of a
steady state if the environment is generalized to standard general-equilibrium setups with a
representative-ﬁrm production function, as all cases examined by Caselli and Ventura (2000).
The result of Theorem 3 might prove useful for researchers studying the impact of changes
in the demographic characteristics of population over time, under the assumption that each
family type has to face some minimum household setup costs (demographically-dependent
subsistence levels), such as housing and nutrition needs.
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